As a history geek who speaks German pretty well, it’s probably not a surprise that I spend a lot of time reading about twentieth-century German history. And one of the more aggravating subjects in the field is the notion that Naziism – the German contraction of Nazional Sozialismus, “National Socialism” – is, in fact, socialist and not capitalistic.
Of course, if you had a mainstream, left-of-center history teacher – and I had a few – you learned what’s become the orthodoxy in learning about the era; since Hitler and Stalin fought the bloodiest war in history against each other, Hitler must be the opposite of Stalin; ergo since Stalin was “far left”, Hitler must be “far right”; since communism hated capitalism, Naziism must have been pure capitalism.
It was all buncombe, of course. In Modern Times – perhaps the essential libertarian/conservative apologetic of my lifetime, at least from my little perspective – Paul Johnson spelled out the case that Hitler learned a lot – a lot – from Lenin and Stalin, positive (the need for total, brutal control) and negative (the need to do it by co-opting, rather than destroying, society’s institutions).
But the message – and its importance today – still need to sink in, in some quarters.
Fortunately, Ilya Somin at Volokh is on the case, reviewing two new books on the subject, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, by Adam Tooze and Hitler’s Beneficiaries: : Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State, by Gotz Aly.
Why care?
Nonetheless, the socialist element of National Socialism matters for three reasons. First…some still claim that Nazism was a form of “capitalism” and try to use this association to discredit free markets. Second, and far more important, Tooze and Aly show that far-reaching state control over the economy was an essential element in Nazi policy, without which Hitler could not have carried out his plans for conquest and mass murder. It also helped quiesce potential German opposition to Nazi policies; both by imposing state control on economic resources that any opposition movement would need to support itself, and by “buying off” potential opponents through welfare state handouts (as Aly emphasizes).
The concentration of economic power in the hands of the state does not always lead to atrocities as extreme as Hitler’s. But it does significantly increase the risk that these types of abuses will occur – not to mention numerous lesser (though still severe) atrocities. In the twentieth century, both left-wing (communist) and right-wing (Nazi) forms of state domination of the ecoomy paved the way for war, repression, and mass murder. There is little reason to expect better results from similar policies in the future. This is an important point, given the recent renewed popularity of socialist ideas in some parts of the Third World, such as parts of Latin American.
Finally, Barkai’s discussion of Hitler’s view of the world economy bears a remarkable similarity to the analysis put forward by many of today’s opponents of free trade and globalization. Both view the world economy as a zero sum game; both reject the possibility that free international trade can provide for a growing population and lead to the development of “have not” nations; and both claim that the wealthy nations of the West had “rigged” the rules of the international economic game in their favor.
Stuff for the summer beach reading list.
Next job for historians: write a book explaining to the attention-span-deprived that even though Hitler exploited endemic anti-Semitism in German society (and in the native Lutheran and Catholic churches), he wasn’t actually a Christian…
(Via Jay Reding)