Lessons Learned
By Mitch Berg
How counterinsurgency war is fought, courtesy of the Times of London.
It’s a classic counterinsurgency war story, led by an American armor officer who got his start in Special Forces (which, above all, has practiced exactly this kind of asymmetric warfare since it was founded in the 1950’s) a Captain Patriquin – who led a long, patient, less-than-martial-looking effort to recruit, cajole and co-opt the sheikhs of Ramadi to turn against the Al-Quaeda thugs who’d take control of the city:
He was a big man, moustachioed, ex-Special Forces, fluent in Arabic and engaged in what was then a revolutionary experiment for a US military renowned for busting doors down. He and a small group from the First Brigade Combat Team, part of the 1st Armoured Division, were assiduously courting the local sheikhs – tribal leaders – over endless cups of tea and cigarettes…
The Captain practiced some other aspects of counterinsurgency – things that don’t occur in the much-hyped GAO report on the country:
Captain Patriquin may have offered more than mere words. His main interlocutor, Sheikh Abdul Sittar Bezea al-Rishawi, told The Times that he gave them guns and ammunition too. The sheikhs did rise up. They formed a movement called the Anbar Awakening, led by Sheikh Sittar. They persuaded thousands of their tribesmen to join the Iraqi police, which was practically defunct thanks to al-Qaeda death threats, and to work with the reviled US troops. The US military built a string of combat outposts (COPs) throughout a city that had previously been a no-go area, and through a combination of Iraqi local knowledge and American firepower they gradually regained control of Ramadi, district by district, until the last al-Qaeda fighters were expelled in three pitched battles in March. What happened in Ramadi was later replicated throughout much of Anbar province.
The effect?
Ramadi’s transformation is breathtaking. Shortly before I arrived last November masked al-Qaeda fighters had brazenly marched through the city centre, pronouncing it the capital of a new Islamic caliphate. The US military was still having to fight its way into the city through a gauntlet of snipers, rocket-propelled grenades, suicide car bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Fifty US soldiers had been killed in the previous five months alone. I spent 24 hours huddled inside Eagles Nest, a tiny COP overlooking the derelict football stadium, listening to gunfire, explosions and the thump of mortars. The city was a ruin, with no water, electricity or functioning government. Those of its 400,000 terrified inhabitants who had not fled cowered indoors as fighting raged around them.
Today Ramadi is scarcely recognisable. Scores of shattered buildings testify to the fury of past battles, but those who fled the violence are now returning. Pedestrians, cars and motorbike rickshaws throng the streets. More than 700 shops and businesses have reopened. Restaurants stay open late into the evening. People sit outside smoking hookahs, listening to music, wearing shorts – practices that al-Qaeda banned. Women walk around with uncovered faces. Children wave at US Humvees. Eagles’ Nest, a heavily fortified warren of commandeered houses, is abandoned and the stadium hosts football matches.
“Al-Qaeda is gone. Everybody is happy,” said Mohammed Ramadan, 38, a stallholder in the souk who witnessed four executions. “It was fear, pure fear. Nobody wanted to help them but you had to do what they told you.”
And the article notes that, rewarding as it is, the job is risky:
Captain Patriquin, 32, a father of three young children, was killed by a roadside bomb days after I left Ramadi last winter. Sheikh Sittar wept when told the news. He and several tribal leaders attended his memorial service. Captain Patriquin “was an extraordinary man who played a very, very important role,” he told The Times.
For what it’s worth, my condolences to the Captain’s family.
And yet – the surge (combined with, I suggest, the even-more-important change in how the military is fighting the insurgency) seems to be giving next week’s report from General Petraeus the most optimistic backdrop we’ve had reason to see for years.
September 7th, 2007 at 7:39 am
From the same article:
“Iraqi Shias are also worried that the new US-trained police forces of Ramadi and Anbar province could eventually metamorphose into well-trained Sunni militias; the Sunni insurgency may be fading, but the Shia-Sunni civil war rages on.”
So, in short, we gave guns, money, and training to former insurgents from the weaker Iraqi sect and allienated members of the stronger sect and the central government (who we are giving more guns and money to).
September 7th, 2007 at 8:40 am
Thanks for checking in today, Rickie. You and your Defeat-and-Retreat crowd are fine supporters of the terrorists.
Thankfully, the troops know better than Rickie-boy:
http://www.glencoenews.com/main.asp?SectionID=18&SubSectionID=31&ArticleID=18432
September 7th, 2007 at 9:00 am
Mitch observed: “…the most optimistic backdrop we’ve had reason to see for years.”
Probably not as optimistic as that “Mission Accomplished” backdrop, though.
September 7th, 2007 at 10:50 am
So, in short, we gave guns, money, and training to former insurgents from the weaker Iraqi sect and allienated members of the stronger sect and the central government (who we are giving more guns and money to).
Armed insurgents? Sure.
“Allienating” other sects and the central government? Yep. Feathers need to be smoothed. That’s how counterinsurgency would seem to be done. We don’t yet know how that the “allienation” is going to resolve itself. But one thing that is a certainty; had we not turned both sects against Al Quaeda, then AQ would continue turning both sects against each other, and a whole lot more efficiently (given that that’s been a huge part of the problem for the past three years).
Probably not as optimistic as that “Mission Accomplished” backdrop, though.
It wasn’t optimistic. It was a statement of fact. The initial mission – topple Hussein, erase the Iraq military – was accomplished. Applying that statement to what happened afterwards might make John Stewart’s nether regions all tingly, but it’s really just parading a bunch of strawmen down the flight deck.
September 7th, 2007 at 11:44 am
Always a bad idea to spike the ball on your own 20 yard line.
Hey, speaking of missions left unaccomplished, looks like Osama’s got a pilot (no, not that kind – a TV pilot!) cued up for the fall season. But what to call it? Mad About Jews? That 9/11 Show? My Wives and Kids? At this rate, he’ll be on the air longer than M*A*S*H.
September 7th, 2007 at 11:50 am
I’m wondering; if Hitler had gained 100 pounds and a prosthetic beard and hidden in a shipping container for Borneo, leaving his burning nation behind him, thence to send petulant audiotapes to Churchill and FDR for many years, would the US media say that we hadn’t won World War II yet?
September 7th, 2007 at 12:02 pm
I’m pretty sure FDR didn’t put up a “Mission Accomplished” sign after Jimmy Doolittle’s raid either.
September 7th, 2007 at 12:19 pm
Mitch wondered: “I’m wondering; if Hitler had gained 100 pounds and a prosthetic beard and hidden in a shipping container for Borneo, leaving his burning nation behind him, thence to send petulant audiotapes to Churchill and FDR for many years, would the US media say that we hadn’t won World War II yet?”
No, but he’d have a show on FOX News.
“Petulant”? Is that what you call it when some guy kicks you in the Balzac and spends the next six years laughing at your inability to do anything about it?
September 7th, 2007 at 1:32 pm
Mitch, you’re not thinking strategically enough. Listen to Rudy.
The way to end the sectarian violence in Iraq is to force the combating militias to defend more territory. The local sunni warlord may be able to fight his way into Anbar, while his Shiite brethren are taking over Basra, but once Rudy spreads the field into Iran, we can use our ample military to force the Iraqi militias to cover Tehran, Qom, and what the hell, let’s take over the border to Damascus as well. The bastards will never be able to sustain it!
All the while, we’ll be greeted as liberators by the united front of Sunni, Shiite, Baathists, Kurds, Christians, and Zoroastrians opposed to the New Caliphate!
Stop thinking small, Mitch. Rudy’s playing long ball.
/jc
September 7th, 2007 at 1:49 pm
Dear Lord, no wonder we have no chance in Iraq:
“But one thing that is a certainty; had we not turned both sects against Al Quaeda, then AQ would continue turning both sects against each other, and a whole lot more efficiently”
There was never a time when both sects sided with AQ. We did not turn the Shia against AQ, AQ everywhere has always been a Sunni / anit-Shia organization. In Iraq it initially gained Sunni support by helping fight the U.S. / Shia central government.
So again, we are paying huge sums to arm the weaker sect. Unless you have a secret plan to reconcile the Shia and Sunni, there is no way this does not end in a larger civil war. At least before Anbar we were clearly aligned with the bigger side.
September 7th, 2007 at 2:04 pm
There was never a time when both sects sided with AQ.
“Siding” is irrelevant. AQ was working to provoke both against each other.
We did not turn the Shia against AQ, AQ everywhere has always been a Sunni / anit-Shia organization.
True, and excessively simplistic to boot.
In Iraq it initially gained Sunni support by helping fight the U.S. / Shia central government.
Which attacks my premise not in the least.
September 7th, 2007 at 3:00 pm
““Siding” is irrelevant” Then why did you say it?
And you still have no answer to the basic question of how to reconcile the Shia and Sunni. Absent such a plan, the recent events in Anbar will be a huge defeat for the U.S.
September 7th, 2007 at 3:03 pm
Dave:
Sounds like the soldier you cite is voting with his feat:
“Koktan signed up for a six-year stint with the National Guard and has about 1-1/2 years left. There also is a two-year inactive commitment for Guardsmen. He said he does not plan on re-enlisting.”
September 7th, 2007 at 5:33 pm
RickDFL said:
“So again, we are paying huge sums to arm the weaker sect. Unless you have a secret plan to reconcile the Shia and Sunni, there is no way this does not end in a larger civil war. At least before Anbar we were clearly aligned with the bigger side.”
and:
“And you still have no answer to the basic question of how to reconcile the Shia and Sunni. Absent such a plan, the recent events in Anbar will be a huge defeat for the U.S.”
As usually, another argument from the “Metro Mobility School of Logic”. Dial up a current event (surge in Anbar), tell the dispatcher where you want to go (defeat), and expect someone else to drive your argument from origin to destination. Not impressive.
September 7th, 2007 at 9:29 pm
Great-great-great grandpa RickDFL:
“And you still have no answer to the basic question of how to reconcile the Blacks and the Whites. Absent such a plan, the recent events in Gettysburg will be a huge defeat for the Union.”
September 8th, 2007 at 7:58 am
Terry:
Let’s start with the basic fact that the U.S. Civil War did not involve any foreign interventions. Next, in the U.S. Civil War one sectarian actor, the North, imposed a sectarian victory on the weaker side, the South, with help from a minority Southern sect, Blacks. There was no attempt at a sectarian compromise.
In Iraq, by contrast, our nominal strategy (to the degree one can discern any strategy at all) is to bring about a sectarian compromise. Absent such a compromise, we might simply side with the Shia and let them win a sectarian war. That seemed to be our de facto policy up til Anbar. But now we have weakened our Shia alliance to arm their Sunni enemies.
To put your analogy properly, it is as if France and Britain intervened on the side of the North in the U.S. civil war. Then after Gettysburg, they switched sides, and started supplying weapons and money to Southern whites so that they could fight the handful of Mexicans in the Confederacy.
September 9th, 2007 at 9:15 am
Terry thinks he slam-dunked RickDFL: “And you still have no answer to the basic question of how to reconcile the Blacks and the Whites. Absent such a plan, the recent events in Gettysburg will be a huge defeat for the Union.”
You’re not bright enough to know this, Terry, but the disputed election of 1876 (see 2000), brought about a corrupt compromise to pull federal troops out of the south, putting blacks under the control of the KKK insurgents for the better part of the next century, reinstituting slavery in all but name and ensuring that blacks couldn’t vote or exercise any other fundamental American rights. The history of Reconstruction doesn’t exactlly help your argument.
Dumbass.