The Small War, Part II
By Mitch Berg
Let’s switch to Jeopardy mode for a bit:
ANSWER: “We Can’t Win”.
QUESTION: Choose from the following:
- “What did the left say about Vietnam?”
- “What did the left say about El Salvador?”
- “What did the left say about Afghanistan until the (real) Northern Alliance and the Special Forces rode into Kandahar?”
- “What does the medialeft (I conflate media and left on purpose, since in reality they’ve pretty much conflated themselves) assure us about Iraq at every opportunity?”
The answer, if you’re a discerning news consumer, is “all of the above, and then some”.
———-
“Iraq is un-winnable”.
That is one of the left’s great current conceits. It’s only as true as the nation wants to make it, of course; all wars are winnable (or at least loseable by the other guy) – Finland beat the Soviets, at least in regulation time, in 1940 (sudden death overtime brought the Finns a limited defeat and the Soviets a very costly “victory”); British, on the other hand, conquered most of the globe with a laughably-small force; the Colonies beat the British with even less; Britain in turn held out alone against Hitler. Of course, listing these wars like that oversimplifies the issues; each of them, “impossible” as they were by conventional measures, happened for reason that make perfect sense in retrospect.
But the upshot is that there is no such thing as an “unwinnable war”. Of course, all wars can be lost.
The distinction is important, especially when you look at the history of counterinsurgencies.
I remember the NARN’s interview with Steven Vincent, the freelance journalist who made such a name for himself covering Iraq, alone and without a net (and was eventually murdered on his second tour in the country, by criminals in Basra). In our final interview with him – the last interview he gave before leaving for Iraq the second time – we talked about the differences between the approach in the American and British-controlled regions of Iraq. The American zone was, true to “Neocon” dogma, taking the all-or-nothing route; full civil democracy, the whole enchilada, immediately. The British, drawing on centuries of experience ruling huge swathes of the world and immense native populations with a tiny military and civil servant cadre, had a different approach. They made deals with unsavory people to observe, rat out and countervail other unsavory people. They co-opted one group of thugs to smack down another group of thugs. They used, even exploited, criminal disorder to their larger goal – keeping relative order in their sector. Until recently, it worked -very arguably (Vincent was murdered in Basra, along with many other people, after all). They also kept their troops out among the Iraqis of the region, intermingling, buying their supplies locally, walking around without helmets or body armor (unless events demanded them) – and until recently, when the Brits announced their intention to start withdrawing, Basra was relatively peaceful compared to the miasma of Baghdad and Anbar.
They’ve done this – winning “unwinnable” counterinsurgency wars – before. In India from the 1600s through WWII, in the pre-Revolutionary American west, and South Africa in 1900, in Borneo and Malaysia and Aden and Oman in the sixties and seventies, the Brits learned the blocking and tackling of winning insurgencies: isolate the insurgents from the locals by being among the locals, by winning civilian hearts and minds, by co-opting other elements of the local society against the insurgents (including cultivating “friendly”, if often conventionally-unsavory, warlords, in the hopes of taming them when the crisis wanes – as, indeed, they did), and, when and if needed, following the isolated insurgent into the wilderness and hunting him down and killing him, using the minimal British force possible (and relying heavily on the locals to do the dirty work; British history is crowded with colorful characters who went overseas and “went native” leading indigenous troops in the service of the King; the British special forces, the SAS and SBS, are directly descended from such characters).
As Vincent noted, that approach is foreign to modern Americans (and when I say “modern”, it’s because the distinction is important, as we’ll see in a bit); neocons demand “democracy now”; liberals pine for the moral clarity of World War II and, like Jimmy Carter, get queasy at the thought of associating with, even supporting, unsavory, often thuggish, frequently deeply ugly people to defeat people who are not, to the outside observer, a whole lot different.
And when I say the approach is “foreign to Americans”, I mean “Americans who don’t follow this nation’s history, especially”.
Lost in the palaver about the Iraq War – and the inevitable Vietnam comparisons that the left leans on to the exclusion of most rational thought when the thought of war, especially counterinsurgency war, comes up – is that a hundred years ago, the United States was the master of small wars against small, asymmetric groups of insurgents. In winning the American West against the Indians, and then in our first “imperial” wars – the Philippines in the early 1900s, Nicaragua in the ’20s and ”30s, and several others in between and beyond (up through El Salvador in the ’80s), the US won wars the way the British won the same kinds of wars all across their empire for hundreds of years, from India in the 1600s through Aden and Northern Ireland in the seventies (as related by everyone from Robert Kaplan and Max Boot to Robert Nagl:
- Keep our troops out among the natives – even in tiny numbers, the act of showing a presence among the civilians makes a huge difference in…
- …Cutting the guerillas off from the people. Make it impossible for the insurgents to get supplies, recruits and support (and, commensurately, to exert control through coercion and terror).
- Co-opt and exploit local institutions to help you with #2 first – and then build new institutions. This drives liberals (and, it must be fairly said, neoconservatives) crazy; surely, they reason, imposing democracy and human rights immediately must be a better thing – right? Like most ideals, it’s not always true, of course. It was a former Ranger – who’d spent a few years training for this exact kind of warfare – who introduced me to the saying “perfect is the enemy of good enough”. In many parts of the world, the only human right that matters right now is the right to not get blown up, beheaded, shot or gang-raped. Once those are taken care of, one can worry about the more finesseful rights of man.
- Build up the local institutions that work. Liberals – and some neoconservatives – grouse about this because it involves “picking and choosing warlords”.
It’s nothing new; we did it in the Philippines in 1900 to great effect; the desert Southwest wasn’t subdued by columns of blue-jacketed cavalry, but by small teams of Apache renegades led by tiny cadres of soldiers on long, unsupported pushes through the desert that made it impossible for the Mescaleros to carry on a regular life in the US. More recently, in El Salvador in the ’80s – a great, and successful, example of this kind of war which was also judged “un-winnable” by the mainstream left and media – there was a choice; between left-wing death squads, and right-wing death squads. The US (and the Special Forces that did the work) chose to support the right-wing death squads, on the assumption (correct, as it turned out) that they would eventually be easier to co-opt, fold into the regular military, and eventually teach the basics of human rights. The solution in El Salvador was messy, imperfect – and remains light-years better than it was during the days of unchecked insurgency, leaving the nation a functional, if imperfect, democracy. Another example – many times in Imperial Grunts Kaplan notes US Special Forces (”Green Berets”) in Afghanistan remarking that their mission is to make the locals – the Afghan Army, as well as the local warlords’ militias – look good. The goal, of course, is to build the stability that’s needed, not just for democracy to take hold (if indeed it can or will), but to deny Afghanistan to the terrorists as a safe haven again.
The good news? Once you get through the job of making the population safe from the insurgents, it can – indeed, say many of the subjects in Imperial Grunts, should – be done with many fewer troops than we currently have in Iraq.
So who screwed up?
And why are the Democrats wrong?
Oh, heck – I guess I’ll make this three parts.
August 21st, 2007 at 8:21 am
Mitch revealed: “all wars are winnable (or at least loseable by the other guy)”
The failure of the war is contained in that statement. We achieved the latter. We can’t achieve the former, because winning was never in the cards. We can defeat Saddam’s army, capture and kill Saddam, subdue the population, more or less. In fact, we can do practically anything we choose to in Iraq.
The problem is, we could never pacify Iraq for a cost in lives, money, diplomatic capital and lost opportunities elsewhere that made the venture worthwhile. The war has always been an auction in which we started the bidding at $200 for an asset worth $50. Sure you can beat the other guy in the bidding, but if the price you pay is many times the value of the thing you’re trying to get your hands on, you’re a loser too.
Look at Iraq from Osama bin Laden’s point of view, the war has taken down a secular government in an economically and strategically important middle eastern country, occupied American resources that could be better used elsewhere and provided a rallying point for anti-American Islamic fundamentalism. Win win win. Bush is playing three-card monte with
Any advantage the U.S. could gain in Iraq (particularly in the absense of Saddam’s phantom WMDs) is outweighed by the cost. That’s always been the case. Cheney got it in 1994:
“The question for the president, in terms of whether or not we went on to Baghdad and took additional casualties in an effort to get Saddam Hussein was how many additional dead Americans is Saddam worth. And our judgement was not very many and I think we got it right.”
Now that we’re in, clearly it’s important to minimize any further harm to the U.S. and to Iraq and that may require an American military presence for the indefinite future. But that simply means we’re keeping our losses to a minimum. Not that we’re winning or that there’s even any possibility of winning.
August 21st, 2007 at 8:27 am
“Win win win. Bush is playing three-card monte with”
should be:
Win win win. Bush is playing three-card monte with a very sharp dealer. He’s made a sucker out of his country.
[Angryclown has just sacked his girl for the dictation error. Applications are being considered. C-cups a minimum. No exceptions, Colleen!]
August 21st, 2007 at 9:19 am
Mitch:
1. ‘Keep our troops out among the natives” If you read Fiasco, you would learn that U.S. troops spent lots of time out among the natives – kicking in doors and arresting all military age men. Being out and about only works if there is something useful to do.
2. “Cutting the guerillas off from the people.” It has been the U.S. that has supplied the insurgency with money and weapons. The guerillas are the government. Any civic improvements we try to make become scams for the local party in power. Any security forces we stand up get infiltrated with militias.
3. “Co-opt and exploit local institutions”. In Iraq, it is the U.S. that has been co-opted and exploited. All factions see us as a resource for money and weapons. Since we have no realistic strategic goal in Iraq we are unable to build any sort of loyal local coalition.
4. “Build up the local institutions that work. Liberals – and some neoconservatives – grouse about this because it involves “picking and choosing warlords”.” I wish our military commanders in Iraq could even mange to settle on a strategy of ‘picking a warlord’. We are supporting all of the warlords at the same time against each other. And not in any intelligent ‘play them of against each other’ way.
The problem in Iraq is that the U.S. has zero reliable local allies. Your whole strategy depends on something you do not have.
August 21st, 2007 at 10:18 am
[...] Mitch Berg has a must-read post on learning the right lessons from the war in Iraq, specifically why Iraq is not an “unwinnable” conflict. He notes: I remember the NARN’s interview with Steven Vincent, the freelance journalist who made such a name for himself covering Iraq, alone and without a net (and was eventually murdered on his second tour in the country, by criminals in Basra). In our final interview with him – the last interview he gave before leaving for Iraq the second time – we talked about the differences between the approach in the American and British-controlled regions of Iraq. The American zone was, true to “Neocon” dogma, taking the all-or-nothing route; full civil democracy, the whole enchilada, immediately. The British, drawing on centuries of experience ruling huge swathes of the world and immense native populations with a tiny military and civil servant cadre, had a different approach. They made deals with unsavory people to observe, rat out and countervail other unsavory people. They co-opted one group of thugs to smack down another group of thugs. They used, even exploited, criminal disorder to their larger goal – keeping relative order in their sector. Until recently, it worked -very arguably (Vincent was murdered in Basra, along with many other people, after all). They also kept their troops out among the Iraqis of the region, intermingling, buying their supplies locally, walking around without helmets or body armor (unless events demanded them) – and until recently, when the Brits announced their intention to start withdrawing, Basra was relatively peaceful compared to the miasma of Baghdad and Anbar. [...]
August 21st, 2007 at 10:48 am
Keep our troops out among the natives” If you read Fiasco, you would learn that U.S. troops spent lots of time out among the natives – kicking in doors and arresting all military age men.
Strawman; this is not what I’m talking about, and you’re being [as deeply] disingenuous [as usual].
“Cutting the guerillas off from the people.” It has been the U.S. that has supplied the insurgency with money and weapons
Precisely. And that, for better or worse, may be part of the answer. Co-opting part of the insurgency to fight against the others. As, indeed, we are.
In Iraq, it is the U.S. that has been co-opted and exploited. All factions see us as a resource for money and weapons. Since we have no realistic strategic goal in Iraq we are unable to build any sort of loyal local coalition.
Talking points that would seem to be overtaken by current events.
I wish our military commanders in Iraq could even mange to settle on a strategy of ‘picking a warlord’.
Ibid.
August 21st, 2007 at 11:22 am
This is where our new strategy is so brilliant.
By backing the Sunni insurgents against Al Qaeda, at the same time we’re backing the Shiite central government against the Sunni Baathists, and the same time we’re backing the Kurds and the Sunnis to stifle Iranian influence among the Shiite militias, at the same time we’re backing the central Shiite government against regionaly disruption by the Kurds, we’re making EVERYBODY our friends! That’s what great about being on all sides of the civil war.
Hell, the Sunnis are now so secure from our backing that they don’t need to be part of the government that we’re also backing.
Even smarter, we know which insurgent groups and militias are the ones to back, because they’ve got a proven record of killing U.S. soldiers.
No point backing a horse that can’t win a race.
/jc
August 21st, 2007 at 1:04 pm
Mitch said,
“Lost in the palaver about the Iraq War… … is that a hundred years ago, the United States was the master of small wars against small, asymmetric groups of insurgents. In winning the American West against the Indians…”
Lost in your insulting and absurd analogy is that the action taken against the Native Americans – those you consider insurgents – was genocide. It was no more a war that the action in Iraq is a war.
August 21st, 2007 at 1:20 pm
Mitch:
“Co-opting part of the insurgency to fight against the others. As, indeed, we are.”
OK which part do you want to co-opt against the other. For example is Basra Sadr’s JAM is currently fighting for control with the SIIC’s Badr Brigades. Which side should the U.S. support and why?
August 21st, 2007 at 1:36 pm
Lost in your insulting and absurd analogy is that the action taken against the Native Americans – those you consider insurgents – was genocide. It was no more a war that the action in Iraq is a war.
Of course, lost in your pointless, inflammatory and insulting response was the response’s complete lack of recognition of the importance of Beethoven in the development of liberal institutions in Europe after 1815.
The “point” wasn’t “lost”. I don’t necessarily disagree with you, at least partially, in a larger moral sense.
But the purpose of the post was not to dissect America’s moral history, but it’s military history. If you push the parameters of a discussion out too far, there can really be no meaningful discussion of any point.
Which is, of course, the norm with you, Doug, but I’m shooting for better.
August 21st, 2007 at 1:38 pm
Which side should the U.S. support and why?
The side that can a) win and b) then be co-opted to help create the stability that is needed, in turn, to create something akin to a civil society that observes the rule of law.
Which group is that? I don’t know. I’m not even an armchair commander. I’m not laying out a plan; merely trying to illuminate a principle drawn from history.
August 21st, 2007 at 1:48 pm
Mitch is placing bets:
>>Which side should the U.S. support and why?
>
>The side that can a) win and b) then be co-opted to help create the stability that is needed, in turn, to create something akin to a civil society that observes the rule of law.
I told you, the side that has proven it’s seriousness by killing the most Americans (or Brits) (can’t forget the Poles!).
The militia that kills the most Americans is the one that’s showed its grity determination and organizational skills. Any militia group that can’t manage that isn’t worth a misplaced rifle.
Besides, they’re the ones who know where all the IEDs are buried.
/jc
August 21st, 2007 at 1:55 pm
The militia that kills the most Americans is the one that’s showed its grity determination and organizational skills. Any militia group that can’t manage that isn’t worth a misplaced rifle.
“What is “everything I am allowed to say, I was told by John Stewart”, Alex?”
August 21st, 2007 at 1:58 pm
Brilliant “slash”! Just like Vietnam. The Viet Cong stood up so we could stand down!
August 21st, 2007 at 2:03 pm
Mitch:
“The side that can a) win and b) then be co-opted to help create the stability that is needed, in turn, to create something akin to a civil society that observes the rule of law.”
But if there is no such group, then your strategy can not work. There is no reason to think there is such a side or that we could figure out which side that was.
a. Given that every Prime Minister we have picked in Iraq lost the next round of elections, I would not want to bet on our ability to pick a winner. To know that you need a reliable loyal local source of intelligence, which we do not have. Ask someone from SIIC they will tell you they can win and will support the rule of law. Ask someone from JAM you will get a different answer. Who you gonna believe?
b. How are you going to co-opt them. We do not have anything to co-opt them with. They want guns and money to gain power. Once they have the power there is nothing we can offer to gain their continued support. Ever winning CI must have an political and idealogical agenda that unites your local allies with the outside power. “Please do not let George Bush look like a loser” won’t cut it with Iraqis.
August 21st, 2007 at 2:07 pm
Jon Stewart? A 9/11 phony. Mention him no more.
He wasn’t down there knee deep at Ground Zero every day like my man Rudy.
/jc
August 21st, 2007 at 2:16 pm
But if there is no such group, then your strategy can not work.
Your “if” is duly noted, classified under “pure hypotheticals”, and filed away.
Given that every Prime Minister we have picked in Iraq lost the next round of elections, I would not want to bet on our ability to pick a winner.
Picking the “group” has nothing to do with elections.
Ever winning CI must have an political and idealogical agenda that unites your local allies with the outside power.
Correlation masquerading as causation. This happens in some CI wars; if it were a precondition, then the British should not have won their CI campaigns in Malaysia (twice), Aden, and for that matter India; South African and Rhodesian troops (before the political settlements that resulted in majority rule and Mugabe’s cult of personality, respectively), the Philippines in 1906, Nicaragua in the ’20s and ’30s, and El Salvador in the ’80s and the ’90s, the only “agenda” that united the US/UK and the locals was “stability” and “not getting ones’ family killed or gang-raped”.
It’s where these sorts of things start.
Larger ideological issues don’t matter until the whole “death” and “starvation” and “gang-rape” things are dealt with.
August 21st, 2007 at 2:17 pm
He wasn’t down there knee deep at Ground Zero every day like my man Rudy.
You’re a lawyer, right? You know your way around Latin? I took a year of it, but for the life of me I can’t remember the Latin phrase for “non sequitur”.
Can you remember that Latin phrase?
It’s driving me nuts.
August 21st, 2007 at 2:21 pm
Oooh, can I play?
“Jon Stewart? A 9/11 phony. Mention him no more. He wasn’t down there knee deep at Ground Zero every day like my man Rudy.”
Who is Stephen Colbert? I’d like Left-Wing Dribble for $400.
August 21st, 2007 at 2:25 pm
Basically, Rick’s argument boils down to the racist trope that Iraqis can’t be democrats because they’re a bunch of savages who just want to slaughter each other.
Reality, as always, is a hell of a lot more complex. The Sunnis are on our side because they know damned well that the second we leave, they’re as good as dead. Absent US protection, Iraq’s Sunnis with be ethnically cleansed out of existence by Iranian-backed Shi’a militias. They have every reason to want the US as a buffer against the Shi’ites.
The Shi’ites, on the other hand, are the targets of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is a Salafist organization, and the Salafis think that the Shi’a are barely better than the kuffar (infidels). Even though the native Iraqi Sunnis probably wouldn’t stand a chance against the Sh’ia, al-Qaeda could make things very difficult in Iraq.
Iraq Shi’ites also aren’t Iranian Shi’ites. Iranians are Farsi-speaking Persians, Iraqis are Arabs. Some of the worst fighting in the Iran-Iraq War was between co-sectarians in the al-Faw region of Iraq. Al-Sadr’s JAM is almost certainly a proxy militia for the Iranians, which is why JAM is so disliked by many Iraqis. The Shi’ites don’t want to trade a relatively kind US occupation for the sort of brutality they received under the Iranians.
And the Kurds, they’re more pro-American than most Americans. Barzani is corrupt, but his brand of corruption is more about lining his own pockets than funding jihad. The Kurds want Dohuk to be the next Dubai, and that’s why they have every interest in not rocking the boat — and the presence of Turkish troops along the borders doesn’t hurt in keeping them in line.
What RickDFL doesn’t realize — like most anti-war partisans — is that democracy doesn’t take a bunch of perfect little people singing Kumbaya and all getting along — most democracies are formed out of the need to balance antagonistic elements. Our own democracy was formed out of the need to balance the interests of the southern agrarian class with the northern mercantlists — and it took 80 years of simmering before we had a civil war, and Iraq doesn’t have an issue like slavery that could spark something bigger than what exists now.
The Iraqi constitution is a weakly federal system — the central government doesn’t matter all that much. Iraq will survive not because the Iraqis are all perfect democrats, but because self-interest dictates that each group is better off together than trying to cast off on their own.
To believe RickDFL’s argument, you’d have to believe that Iraqis are so blinded by sectarian rage that they’re willing to act completely against their own self interest. While such a thing is possible, the Iraqis aren’t all idiots. They know what the consequences of sectarian partition are, and that’s why there’s almost no support for such a plan within Iraq.
August 21st, 2007 at 2:27 pm
Colbert? Huh? He wasn’t at Ground Zero at all.
And Stewart, he couldn’t even defeat the Malaysians.
/jc
August 21st, 2007 at 2:30 pm
And Stewart, he couldn’t even defeat the Malaysians.
Is it noli contendere? No. Dammit.
What is that phrase?
August 21st, 2007 at 2:30 pm
Non sequitur, Mitch?
You’re the one who keeps bringing up Jon Stewart.
I’m focusing on which American-killing militia we should help win this thing!
/jc
August 21st, 2007 at 2:32 pm
defeat the Malaysians
Slash,
Do you have the faintest idea what war I’m talking about?
If so, do you have the foggiest notion why it matters?
I think I know the answer, but I’m nothing if not the fairest (and most civil-liberty-supporting) person anywhere.
August 21st, 2007 at 2:36 pm
I’m focusing on which American-killing militia we should help win this thing!
Ah, you want to be taken seriously. OK.
Your statement perfectly illustrates my point. Liberals (and you are one, albeit a rather authoritarian one) are either aghast or crippled with cognitive dissonance at the notion of picking one group of thugs to play off against another group of thugs.
You do know that in El Salvador, the US supported groups that were linked with the murders of American citizens against groups that killed other American citizens, don’t you? (I know, of course you don’t). Why do you suppose this happened?
You illustrate my point perfectly! It’s like having an animated Powerpoint drop, Slashus ex machina, from the sky on cue!
August 21st, 2007 at 2:38 pm
Mitch:
“Your “if” is duly noted, classified under “pure hypotheticals”, and filed away.”
Well I sure our troops will be happy to hear you complete indifference to the fundamental basis of the strategy they are asked to die for.
Your total inability to outline any sort of scenario by which local Iraq militias get co-opted is proof that your strategy is wishful thinking.
August 21st, 2007 at 2:44 pm
Well I sure our troops will be happy to hear you complete indifference to the fundamental basis of the strategy they are asked to die for.
I’m indifferent to your hypothetical henpecking. There’s a huge difference.
Your total inability to outline any sort of scenario by which local Iraq militias get co-opted is proof that your strategy is wishful thinking.
For me to try to outline which militia to co-opt would be the kind of academic auto-eroticism that would bring the “chickenhawk” crew out of the woodwork. Justifiably so.
And it’s not “my” strategy. Never has been. It’s been the strategy of every nation that’s ever successfully fought a counterinsurgency war (that didn’t involve completely razing the country, slaughtering its inhabitants and sowing the earth with salt).
August 21st, 2007 at 2:59 pm
Jay:
Who actually shows some knowledge about Iraq deserves a response, but first lets clear up a few howlers.
“Al-Sadr’s JAM is almost certainly a proxy militia for the Iranians, which is why JAM is so disliked by many Iraqis”
Of the three major Shia parties, Sadr is the least identified with Iran. Dawa and SIIC were exile groups based in and sponsored by Iran. Sadr’s main base of street cred is that he never fled from Saddam to Iran. Right now JAM is fighting SIIC in Basra on a ‘drive out the Persians’ platform. Sadr is also the least supportive of a partition which puts him on the side of the Sunni’s.
“The Shi’ites don’t want to trade a relatively kind US occupation for the sort of brutality they received under the Iranians.”
For all Shia, Iran is far more popular than the U.S. Any Shia party forced to choose between Iran and the U.S. will choose Iran. The invasion has been a huge boost to Iran’s regional power.
“And the Kurds, they’re more pro-American than most Americans.”
Up until U.S. troops try to stop them from taking Kirkuk. Then they will make a deal with Iran.
“They know what the consequences of sectarian partition are, and that’s why there’s almost no support for such a plan within Iraq.”
Kurdish independence is the fundamental policy of the Kurds. Both Dawa and SIIC support an autonomous super-province that Sadr and the Sunnis see as tantamount to partition.
I agree with you that Democracy is messy and that the Iraqi will eventually figure out what to do. I just see no reason why U.S. lives and dollars have to be wasted on the effort. I can not see any way it advances the Iraqis interests or ours.
August 21st, 2007 at 3:01 pm
Who actually shows some knowledge about Iraq deserves a response
Yeah, big talk from someone who’s done nothing but mouth talking points throughout this thread, and has a palpable ignorance of military history.
This simple blog obviously doesn’t “deserve” your response. So go fuck off and pollute someone else’s bandwidth, or at least wait until you’re qualified to condescend.
I vote for “fuck off”.
August 21st, 2007 at 3:04 pm
Oh, yeah – and speaking of “howlers”:
I agree with you that Democracy is messy and that the Iraqi will eventually figure out what to do.
Yeah, just the way they always do in that part of the world; with the strongest strongman killing his opponents.
I just see no reason why U.S. lives and dollars have to be wasted on the effort. I can not see any way it advances the Iraqis interests or ours.
If you think Iraq, in its current state, is equipped to find anything but a more miserable solution than it has even now, then you are not equipped to carry on in this discussion.
I urge you not to try.
August 21st, 2007 at 3:09 pm
Mitch:
“For me to try to outline which militia to co-opt would be the kind of academic auto-eroticism that would bring the “chickenhawk” crew out of the woodwork”
No. Sending other people to die without any practical idea of how they win is the definition of a ‘chickenhawk’.
“It’s been the strategy of every nation that’s ever successfully fought a counterinsurgency war”
But the operative question is whether that strategy can be applied to Iraq by the U.S. Right now the Iranians are carrying it out quite nicely, because they have solid local intelligence, reliable local allies, and a common political agenda. We are not, not because someone forget the magic CI recipe, but because we can not.
August 21st, 2007 at 3:12 pm
No. Sending other people to die without any practical idea of how they win is the definition of a ‘chickenhawk’.
And I’ve outlined what would seem to be a practical strategy, inasmuch as it’s the one their far-from-chicken leader, Gen. Petraeus, has adopted.
Right now the Iranians are carrying it out quite nicely, because they have solid local intelligence, reliable local allies, and a common political agenda
Partly correct, as far as it goes (Jay pointed out the shortcomings of your statement pretty capably).
but because we can not
Easter bunny alert. Statement that calls purely for faith in your conjecture, which would in turn seem to be based purely on your ideological dogma.
August 21st, 2007 at 3:15 pm
Mitch:
“Yeah, just the way they always do in that part of the world; with the strongest strongman killing his opponents.”
Isn’t that what you are advocating for? The U.S. find a new strongman to bring some order?
“If you think Iraq, in its current state, is equipped to find anything but a more miserable solution than it has even now, then you are not equipped to carry on in this discussion.”
What reason is there to think an Iraqi solution will be more miserable than an Iraqi + U.S. solution?
August 21st, 2007 at 3:30 pm
Isn’t that what you are advocating for? The U.S. find a new strongman to bring some order?
Because they’re two different types of “order”. If you can’t see the difference between “order” in Pyongyang and “order” in San Salvador, it’d explain a lot.
What reason is there to think an Iraqi solution will be more miserable than an Iraqi + U.S. solution?
And you dare to condescend to anyone?
August 21st, 2007 at 3:42 pm
“What reason is there to think an Iraqi solution will be more miserable than an Iraqi + U.S. solution?”
I’m sure that no matter what level of misery is obtained post U.S., the left will only see kite flying.
August 21st, 2007 at 3:50 pm
“Of the three major Shia parties, Sadr is the least identified with Iran.”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/23/AR2006012301701.html
The Jaish-al-Mahdi is seen, both in the West and in Iraq, as little more than a proxy force for the Iranians. Why else would al-Sadr himself flee to Iran whenever the heat got too much for him?
“For all Shia, Iran is far more popular than the U.S.”
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20060410/ai_n16181065
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0220/p01s02-woiq.html
Yeah, the Iraqis sure love the people who committed mass genocide against them. Again, Iraqi Shi’a are not like Iranian Shi’a. They don’t speak the same language. They’re not the same ethnicity. They fought one of the bloodiest wars in the last 50 years against each other.
For that matter, Iraqi and Iranian Shi’ites have vastly different schools of thought in regard to Shi’a Islam itself. Iraqi Shi’a follow the Najaf school of Shi’a Islam which interprets the “vilayet al-faqih” (leadership of Shi’ites in the absence of the Imam Ali and his descendants) as creating a kind of separation of mosque and state. Under the Najaf school, sacred leaders should not engage in politics as it compromises their faith. (The exact opposite of the way the West sees the concept.)
“Up until U.S. troops try to stop them from taking Kirkuk. Then they will make a deal with Iran.”
The Iranians hate the Kurds. Kirkuk is already a largely Kurdish city, and the Kurds aren’t stupid enough to throw away all the progress they’ve made to get what they already have. Especially given that there’s already a scheduled referendum to decide the fate of Kirkuk in November that the Kurds are virtually certain to win.
“I agree with you that Democracy is messy and that the Iraqi will eventually figure out what to do. I just see no reason why U.S. lives and dollars have to be wasted on the effort. I can not see any way it advances the Iraqis interests or ours.”
1) Because the alternative is an Iraq that looks like Lebanon in the mid-1980s.
2) Because the cost in US lives and treasure now is significantly less than what it would be later on when we’d inevitably be drawn back into the conflict.
3) Because al-Qaeda has made Iraq their fight, and neither the US nor Iraq has much interest in ceding the battlefield to them.
August 21st, 2007 at 4:20 pm
Jay:
“Why else would al-Sadr himself flee to Iran whenever the heat got too much for him?”
Sadr is less tied to Iran than SIIC and Dawa, that does not mean he is pro-U.S. Given a choice of siding with the U.S. or Iran, he would choose Iran. See below
“They don’t speak the same language. They’re not the same ethnicity.”
This really does not help show that Iraqi Shia will favor the U.S. over Iran. There are very big differences between Iraqi and Iranian Shia, they just are tiny compared to the differences between Iraqi Shia and the U.S.
“The Iranians hate the Kurds. Kirkuk is already a largely Kurdish city”
The Iranians have the least trouble with their Kurdish minority compared to Iraq and Turkey. If Iran could destablize pro-Isreal Turkey or the Iraqi Sunnis by siding with the Kurds, they would do so.
1. Same question as Mitch, why do you think the Iraqis will better settle their problems with the U.S. than without an occupation.
2. Why would be inevitably be drawn back in?
3. The best way to kill off al-Qaeda would be to leave and let the Iraqis do it. Whatever support they get comes from opposing the U.S. occupation.
August 21st, 2007 at 4:38 pm
“Because they’re two different types of “order”.”
I agree with you. I just think that the kind of order, most likely to produce some sort of decent civil society in Iraq will most likely come from the Iraqis without U.S. interference. Civil orders produced by local actors are almost always more stable and better reflect the needs of the local population.
August 21st, 2007 at 5:08 pm
“I just think that the kind of order, most likely to produce some sort of decent civil society in Iraq will most likely come from the Iraqis without U.S. interference.”
Possibly. But this doesnt happen until after the genocide. And who is keeping Iran out during that period of time? Or anyone else who want to fill the vacuum we leave?
August 21st, 2007 at 5:10 pm
Mitch explained: “You do know that in El Salvador, the US supported groups that were linked with the murders of American citizens against groups that killed other American citizens, don’t you? (I know, of course you don’t). Why do you suppose this happened?”
Cause Republicans are idiots? Not that I don’t appreciate the mental gymnastics it takes to argue it’s ok that we’ve failed to go after bin Laden while at the same time arming people who are killing us.
August 21st, 2007 at 5:13 pm
Buzzkill blathered: “Possibly. But this doesnt happen until after the genocide. And who is keeping Iran out during that period of time? Or anyone else who want to fill the vacuum we leave?”
Gee Buzzkill, too bad that bit of brilliance didn’t occur to you 3000 KIA ago. Might have saved everybody a bit of bother.
August 21st, 2007 at 5:20 pm
“it’s ok that we’ve failed to go after bin Laden while at the same time arming people who are killing us.”
Who exactly is arguing this, and how are they connected?
By the way, we still banning residents of the Confederacy from joining the military? Sometimes your choice is between bad and worse, and other times you have to use a little nuance and understand local culture. How long after WW2 did we help Western Germany arm itself? Or Italy. Japan? During the late 1800’s were any American Indians armed by and riding with the calvary?
There are no hard and fast rules. You ally yourself with those most likely to help you obtain your objective. Things change.
August 21st, 2007 at 5:21 pm
Good point clown. I was addressing things as they stand now. However, if you can go ahead and fire up your time travel device we can then argue things as they stood 5 years ago.
August 21st, 2007 at 5:31 pm
Buzzkill wondered: “By the way, we still banning residents of the Confederacy from joining the military?”
No, Buzzkill (though Angryclown thinks they should have kept the voting disqualification in place). But you’ll recall that while that6 war was still underway, General Grant kinda preferred they surrender unconditionally.
Boy, you wingnuts get awfully flexible when your hero is losing late in the fourth quarter.
August 21st, 2007 at 5:34 pm
Buzzkill blathered: “Good point clown. I was addressing things as they stand now. However, if you can go ahead and fire up your time travel device we can then argue things as they stood 5 years ago. ”
Mine’s in the shop, buzzkill. Go ahead and take yours back to 2002 and see all the smart guys warning about these very same dangers. Oh, and stick around to hear you wingnuts prattling on about being welcomed as liberators.
August 21st, 2007 at 5:47 pm
“But this doesnt happen until after the genocide.”
But the U.S. presence makes genocide more not less likely. If the Shia know that no external actor will put the Sunnis back in power, they can leave them alone. If we arm the Sunnis, the Shia will feel compelled to wipe them out.
“And who is keeping Iran out during that period of time? Or anyone else who want to fill the vacuum we leave”
Our presence in Iraq drives local parties closer to Iran, see Sadr’s case above. If we extract, Iraqi can concentrate on keeping out Iran.
August 21st, 2007 at 6:32 pm
Mitch complained,
“the purpose of the post was not to dissect America’s moral history, but it’s military history.”
I said nothing about morality but because the two are inexorably connected Mitch, you can’t dissect it’s military history without considering it in the moral context.
You made the decision to equate the actions of insurgents fighting against US forces in Iraq with a native population fighting against genocide in the American West.
So which is it Mitch? Are we committing genocide against the indigenous Iraqi people as you insinuate or were the Native Americans a real threat to American interests and national security?
If only those damn Injuns would have just realized that we were there to liberate them, we could have avoided all of these years of conflict.
August 21st, 2007 at 6:45 pm
Doug:
The genocide of Native Americans was not a deliberate policy and it took place over almost 200 years. Studying U.S. military strategy against the Indians at any given period can be both rewarding and illuminating. It is perfectly reasonably to suggest adopting some of those military strategies without calling for a genocide of some group.
Mitch is not calling for genocide, although that may be a consequence of his policy.
August 21st, 2007 at 8:43 pm
Rick, I realize Mitch isn’t calling for Genocide but he is suggesting that the U.S. Military was fighting a war against an insurgency.
What happened to the Native Americans was not a war and the people fighting for survival were not insurgents.
That is nothing more than a convenient way to justify and rationalize the actions and conduct military operations. This is exactly where the subject of morality becomes an issue. Allegedly, we are fighting insurgents in Iraq because they are a threat to the troops, to the locals and our national security. No doubt, Mitch would argue that we have the moral authority to conduct a war against them. If on the other hand we were to view the Iraqis who are fighting against an occupying force, then their actions – planting IED’s and shooting at us – are entirely justified.
Also, I would argue that the way this government dealt with Native Americans WAS policy. The fact that they didn’t state that the goal was genocide doesn’t change the fact that the actions effectively led to genocide.
In addition, if using the military to remove tribes from their homes and marching them across the country to established, defined and foreign places called reservations, forbidding them from practicing their religion, forbidding them from hunting and forcing Christianity on their children isn’t policy, I don’t know what is.
August 21st, 2007 at 9:55 pm
“Sadr is less tied to Iran than SIIC and Dawa, that does not mean he is pro-U.S. Given a choice of siding with the U.S. or Iran, he would choose Iran. See below”
I never said that he is. Nor is Sadr “less tied” to Iran than the others — Sadr is being funded, supported, and armed by the Iranians. Moqtada al-Sadr is wholly owned by Iran, and the Jaish-al-Mahdi is an Iranian proxy army.
“This really does not help show that Iraqi Shia will favor the U.S. over Iran. There are very big differences between Iraqi and Iranian Shia, they just are tiny compared to the differences between Iraqi Shia and the U.S.”
It’s simple: Iraqi Shi’a know that if the US leaves, they end up being stuck between Iran and al-Qaeda. Again, it’s in their own self-interest not to have Iraq end up as another Yugoslavia.
“The Iranians have the least trouble with their Kurdish minority compared to Iraq and Turkey. If Iran could destablize pro-Isreal Turkey or the Iraqi Sunnis by siding with the Kurds, they would do so.”
Except for the part where the names are right, but everything else is wrong. I’m not sure where your conception of Middle Eastern politics comes from, but it’s like a funhouse mirror — everything is distorted. The Iranians have been shelling Kurdish villages of late. That’s hardly the sort of thing you do if you’re going to side with someone.
“1. Same question as Mitch, why do you think the Iraqis will better settle their problems with the U.S. than without an occupation.”
Because the Syria and Iran are actively destabilizing Iraq, and they don’t have the strength to defend themselves. You make the typical lefty mistake of blaming the US “occupation” as being the problem — the real problem is the fact that Iraq’s neighbors are trying to destabilize the country. Our priority is to get the Iraqis to a point where they can provide their own security — if that isn’t done, no progress on other fronts is possible.
“2. Why would be inevitably be drawn back in?”
Because a fractured Iraq would invariably have spillover effects across the region. Because al-Qaeda would end up with safe harbor in al-Anbar and other Sunni areas. Because Iran has every intention of establishing their own little empire across the Middle East, and that would be a profoundly bad thing for the US.
“3. The best way to kill off al-Qaeda would be to leave and let the Iraqis do it. Whatever support they get comes from opposing the U.S. occupation.”
Then why the Anbar Awakening? If the impetus for al-Qaeda was opposing the US, why is that the Iraqis hate al-Qaeda?
Again, you have your entire view of the situation based upon a complete and total misunderstanding of what’s going on in Iraq. Again, the American “occupation” isn’t what’s causing problems in Iraq — it’s Iranian-backed Shi’ite death squads on one side and al-Qaeda on the other. Both are feeding into a pattern of violence and both need to be stopped.
It would be great if the Iraqis could fight al-Qaeda all by themselves. The problem is that they can’t, and until they have the strength to do so, al-Qaeda would assuredly win.
We leave, the Iranian death squads start killing Sunnis. The Sunnis turn to al-Qaeda for protection. What we think is a terrible civil war now looks like a Sunday picnic in comparison. Trying to argue that our leaving won’t have exactly those consequences is to ignore the reality of the situation — then again, that’s exactly what the Democrats have been doing for the past 8 months.
August 22nd, 2007 at 2:48 am
Doug, moral posturing is not the proper response to a question of military and political strategy.
If a group of Nazi’s and nazi sympathizers fought against US forces after VE day in Germany we would not try to portray them as legitimate resistance against occupation, yet you appear to be doing just that with Iraqi’s who blow up women and children, kidnap foreigners and saw their heads off.
August 22nd, 2007 at 9:18 am
Tomato, tomahto.
Rick, I realize Mitch isn’t calling for Genocide but he is suggesting that the U.S. Military was fighting a war against an insurgency.
What happened to the Native Americans was not a war and the people fighting for survival were not insurgents.
Whatever. Call it whatever you want; it’s irrelevant for purposes of this topic. It was, however, by any rational definition, a long-term, low-intensity war. Little Big Horn wasn’t a sit-in gone awry.
You can call it whatever you want for purposes of describing the clash of two societies; I might even agree with you. But it shared many, many characteristics of counterinsurgency war, and the tactics used to defeat the Natives – socially, demographically and occasionally militarily – were among those used 10 years later in the Philippines, among many other places.
That is nothing more than a convenient way to justify and rationalize the actions and conduct military operations. This is exactly where the subject of morality becomes an issue. Allegedly, we are fighting insurgents in Iraq because they are a threat to the troops, to the locals and our national security. No doubt, Mitch would argue that we have the moral authority to conduct a war against them. If on the other hand we were to view the Iraqis who are fighting against an occupying force, then their actions – planting IED’s and shooting at us – are entirely justified.
Wrong on almost too many counts to bother listing. There is nothing about the Indian Wars that has any connection – other than the history of counterinsurgency tactics – to Iraq, and I’m not claiming it. We DO have the moral authority to operate against the insurgents; the legal Iraqi government says so.
Also, I would argue that the way this government dealt with Native Americans WAS policy. The fact that they didn’t state that the goal was genocide doesn’t change the fact that the actions effectively led to genocide.
Like thousands of such situations before – and rather few since – one people conquered another people. Like the Saxons, the Xhosas, the Bantu, the Berbers, the Chungush, or the Hittites and Carthaginians and Etruscans, or the Romans before them, the Native Americans got overrun, pushed aside, conquered. Unlike the Normans, the Bantu, the Afrikaners, the Arabs, the Russians, Romans and the Vandals, the US has evidenced some collective remorse over this, and has tried – unsatisfactorily, I can fully suspect – to make some form of reparations. Sucks, yes, but ask the Saxons, Xhosa, Bantu, Berber, Chungush, Hittites, Carthaginians, Etruscans and Romans which is better.
Was genocide a policy? It was a goal among some hard-liners; it was resisted by others. Nothing I’ve read about official policy called for complete extinction of the Native races, but there were those who sought it. It’s also fairly clear that the vast majority of Native Americans died of disease – and that, pseudo-academic theories and tales aside, most of that was the result of normal trade and interaction between Europeans and Natives.
In addition, if using the military to remove tribes from their homes and marching them across the country to established, defined and foreign places called reservations, forbidding them from practicing their religion, forbidding them from hunting and forcing Christianity on their children isn’t policy, I don’t know what is.
Of course it was.
It was also established while most of my anscestors were living in the mountains of Norway. Go chase after Ulyssys S. Grant’s descendants.
August 22nd, 2007 at 9:22 am
Jay:
You do not like Sadr because he is tied to Iran, so is your plan is to side with Dawa and SIIC who are more tied to Iran? Everyone who looks at Iraq knows that, of the Shia trio (SIIC, Dawa, and Sadr), Sadr is the least tied to Iran. It just highlights the fundamental lack of strategic thought behind our invasion. If you remove Saddam, the Shia are almost certain to take power. The Iraqi Shia are much closer religiously, financially, and politically to the Iranians. Given the choice between relying on the U.S. or relying on the Iranians, no Shia would pick the U.S. Any post-Saddam Iraqi government was destined to be far closer to Iran than the U.S. If Saddam had died naturally, we would probably now be backing Sadr as a way to block the far more pro-Iranian SIIC and Dawa from taking power. But Sadr is a nationalist who fights the U.S. occupation, so instead we back a government more closely connected to Iran.
By your standards, Sadr is as much a proxy army of the U.S. as Iran. His weapons and training mostly come through his infiltration of the U.S. created, funded, and armed security forces. Much of his street power comes from his control of U.S. sponsored reconstruction projects. He is a leading member of the government we funded and created. Absent our invasion he would be conspiring against Saddam.
“Because the Syria and Iran are actively destabilizing Iraq, and they don’t have the strength to defend themselves.”
Iraqi Sunnis have no desire to defend themselves against Syria. They want Syrian support in their fight against the Shia. The Sunnis will accept our guns and money, but that will not lessen their desire or need for outside Sunni help.
August 22nd, 2007 at 10:36 am
Jeez, you people are making this so complicated.
The solution to Iraq?
Win!
Whee!
/jc
August 22nd, 2007 at 12:07 pm
“You do not like Sadr because he is tied to Iran, so is your plan is to side with Dawa and SIIC who are more tied to Iran? Everyone who looks at Iraq knows that, of the Shia trio (SIIC, Dawa, and Sadr), Sadr is the least tied to Iran.”
Except for the part where that isn’t true.
Sadr is being paid, armed, and supported directly by the Iranians. Again, Moqtada al-Sadr is a wholly-owned creature of the Iranians. That’s why he’s been in Iran several times this year — the Iranian government is shielding him.
The leading party, Dawa, is not particularly in tune with Iran. Dawa supports the Najafi school, which doesn’t believe in theocracy.
SCIRI (now SIIC), is somewhere in the middle. They are generally friendly with Iran, but they’re not getting their orders from Tehran like al-Sadr is.
“If you remove Saddam, the Shia are almost certain to take power. The Iraqi Shia are much closer religiously, financially, and politically to the Iranians.”
Except they have deep-seated religious differences, deep-seated ethnic differences, and don’t particularly like the Iranians.
“Given the choice between relying on the U.S. or relying on the Iranians, no Shia would pick the U.S.”
Which is a self-refuting statement, given that the current Shi’a-led government have been doing exactly what you seem to think they would never do. Al-Maliki and his government know damn well that the Iranians have no interest in a unitary Iraq. The residents of those two areas have been at each others throats since the dawn of civilization. The idea that they’re all of a sudden going to be best buddies when 20 years ago they were slaughtering each other en masse isn’t an informed argument.
“By your standards, Sadr is as much a proxy army of the U.S. as Iran. His weapons and training mostly come through his infiltration of the U.S. created, funded, and armed security forces. Much of his street power comes from his control of U.S. sponsored reconstruction projects. He is a leading member of the government we funded and created. Absent our invasion he would be conspiring against Saddam.”
Again, it’s the typical blame-America-first mentality rather than actually looking at the situation. The only thing that the US has done for al-Sadr is not blown him away when we had the chance. His Mahdi Army is being funded by the Iranians, not us. They’re being armed by the Iranians, not us. They’re being trained by IRGC agents in Iran, not us.
Al-Sadr was a nobody before he ordered the assassination of Abdul Majid al-Khoei in Najaf. He’s a two-bit thug riding on the coattails of his father, and had Ba’athists remained in power, he’d never have lifted a finger to help. It wouldn’t even be surprising if he was the one who ratted out his own family to the Ba’athists to save his own skin.
Al-Sadr is a thug who happened to get lucky. Had we killed him in 2004 when we should, he’d have been a non-entity in Iraqi politics. That was probably the biggest mistake we’ve made in this whole war.
“Iraqi Sunnis have no desire to defend themselves against Syria. They want Syrian support in their fight against the Shia. The Sunnis will accept our guns and money, but that will not lessen their desire or need for outside Sunni help.”
The Syrian border is one of the entrance points for al-Qaeda, and the Syrians are part of an axis with Iran. Iraqi Sunnis don’t trust the Syrians because the Syrians are led by an Alawite family. Syria is a majority-Sunni state run by a Shi’ite government tied with Iran.
The argument that Iraqi Sunnis have no desire to defend themselves against Syria is completely wrong — the al-Assad family is Shi’a, they are tied to Iran, and they are also complicit with al-Qaeda.
I suggest you do a little research into the politics and culture of the region before throwing random arguments out.
August 22nd, 2007 at 1:21 pm
Lets do some research:
Sadr is funding by the U.S. because he has infiltrated the U.S. created security apparatus?
“By his account and those of U.S. military and Iraqi sources, Mahdi militia members have infiltrated much of the country’s security apparatus, including the army, where they reportedly intimidate and bribe troops and commanders to look the other way as militants execute their brutal sectarian “cleansing” agenda.” That means your tax dollars are arming and training Sadr.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mahdiarmy16.1aug16,1,6657340.story?track=rss
Sadr is less tied to Iran than SIIC?
“SIIC has the overt backing of Washington and, ironically, having grown up in Iran for more than two decades before the 2003 war, has the closest ties to Iran. It’s the upper class of the Shiite party power structure.
The Fadhila and Sadr parties share a larger local power base, and although they are believed to have some tie to Iran, are very pro-Iraqi nationalist.”
http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/60124/?page=2
Have Dawa and SIIC decided to support the U.S. over Iran?
“Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s increasing ties with Iran have triggered a splintering of his government.”
http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/59702/
“US President George W. Bush sternly warned Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki Thursday against cozying up to Iran, amid what Washington sees as unsettling signs of warming Baghdad-Tehran relations. . . .
In a highly symbolic move, Maliki met the families of seven Iranian officials arrested in Iraq by US forces on accusations of being members of an elite Revolutionary Guards force on a mission to stir trouble.”
news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070809/pl_afp/usiraniraqbush
You keep jumping from the fact that there are conflicts and differences between Iranian and Iraqi Shia, to the conclusion that Iraqi Shia would prefer to work with the U.S. But those differences pale next to the differences between the U.S. and Iraqi Shia. First, we are not Muslims. Second, the U.S. has been on the side mostly of Sunnis in the Middle East and helped put the Sunnis in charge of Iraq under the Bath. Third, SIIC and Dawa were opposition groups based in Iran. Their are Iran’s version of the Contras. Fourth, because Iran has a large and reliable network of local allies in Iraq, they are able to channel resources to others and gain local allies. The militias and reconstruction projects they do never get infiltrated.
August 22nd, 2007 at 3:42 pm
You keep jumping from the fact that there are conflicts and differences between Iranian and Iraqi Shia, to the conclusion that Iraqi Shia would prefer to work with the U.S. But those differences pale next to the differences between the U.S. and Iraqi Shia.
And you continue to state that as if it were the final word on the subject.
Differences are obvious, and problematic.
But what is in the interests of the Iraqi Shia, especially as they perceive those interests themselves? As people who survived two generations of intense repression at the hands of Sunni, it’s a vital question.
The Iranians have set themselves up as the stronger player in their sphere of influence. It would seem to be incumbent on our military leadership to do something to break that.
And I’d suspect they not only know that, but are working on it; of course, it’s just a suspicion.
August 22nd, 2007 at 3:51 pm
“The Iranians have set themselves up as the stronger player in their sphere of influence. It would seem to be incumbent on our military leadership to do something to break that.”
If our goal was to block Iranian influence in Iran, we should have left Saddam in power. Barring that we should have replaced Saddam with a secular Sunni regime of ex-Baath and tribal leaders. Barring that we should have supported Sadr. Instead we put Iran’s closest Iraqi allies into power, then gave them money and weapons.
August 22nd, 2007 at 7:47 pm
Terry said,
“If a group of Nazi’s and nazi sympathizers fought against US forces after VE day in Germany we would not try to portray them as legitimate resistance against occupation, yet you appear to be doing just that with Iraqi’s who blow up women and children, kidnap foreigners and saw their heads off.”
Go back to what I wrote Terry. I said, “If on the other hand we were to view the Iraqis who are fighting against an occupying force, then their actions – planting IED’s and shooting at us – are entirely justified.
I am not saying their actions ARE justified. I am saying that if you reframe the situation, you can justify just about anything. Mitch implied that the actions against the American Indians was legitimate. He did that by suggesting that it was a military operation against an insurgent population.
To the best of my knowledge, an insurgent is someone who rises up against an established civil or political authority.
In treaty after treaty, the United States granted sovereignty to Tribes but then violated the terms of the treaty by kicking them off their land. The United States was NOT the established authority so to legitimize the actions by claiming the U.S. was fighting a counter-insurgency is bullshit.
The same is true of Iraq. There are factions fighting to become the established authority and we are stuck in the middle of it but it is NOT a war against insurgents.
August 23rd, 2007 at 9:25 am
Another Day, Another American Tax Dollar For Sadr.
U.S. troops are working with Sadr to attack the Sunnis in Baghdad’s Dora neighborhood.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-dora22aug22,0,6400965.story?coll=la-home-world
“The area has been among Baghdad’s worst killing grounds since early 2006, as Iraq’s civil war began to escalate. Shiite militiamen loyal to radical Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, some of them operating under the cover of the Shiite-dominated Iraqi police and commando units, attacked Sunni men. . .
Pressure is now building on the Sunni militants. Sadr’s militiamen are pushing into the neighborhoods west of Dora, and U.S. forces are closing off their supply line from the south, said Maj. Scott Green, the battalion’s executive officer.”
August 23rd, 2007 at 10:36 am
Boy the morning paper is just full of bad news:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6868193,00.html
“Iaq’s prime minister lashed out Wednesday at U.S. criticism, saying no one has the right to impose timetables on his elected government and that his country “can find friends elsewhere.”
. . .
“Those who make such statements are bothered by our visit to Syria. We will pay no attention. We care for our people and our constitution and can find friends elsewhere,” al-Maliki said. ”
So forced to choose between the U.S. and local allies, Iraq choose local allies.
September 6th, 2007 at 10:19 am
[...] Exactly. We’re doing the job right – belatedly, to be sure (to our chagrin) but according to fairly clear lessons from military history. [...]
January 17th, 2008 at 5:25 pm
It’s been five months.
Wow. Looks like I was right, and Rick was wrong!