One reason we study the past is because at its core, human nature is constant. Our fundamental needs and our capacity for good and evil can be recognized in any era. How people in the past reacted to circumstances can be predictive of how people in the present might react when faced with similar circumstances.

I’ll share an example of this. In a well-known passage in his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides records (more like imagines, as he wasn’t there) the Melian Dialogue (Book 5, 84–116), a (one-sided?) conversation between Athens and the people of the island of Melos in 416 BC.

At this point in the Peloponnesian War, Athens was still feeling secure in its naval power. In the first part of the war, Athens had major successes against Sparta at Naupactus, Pylos and Sphacteria. Defeats at Delium and Amphipolis though led to the Peace of Nicias between the two in 421 BC. Meant to last 50 years, it barely lasted 6.

In 416 BC, then, as the peace was unravelling, Athens sent a sizeable force to conquer Melos, the reasons for which aren’t relevant to this discussion. I’ll just add that while it’s easy to think of the ancient Greeks as a bunch of bearded guys sitting around in white robes yammering in the public square about philosophy and democracy, they were very much tribal people.

There were four main tribes: Ionian, Dorian, Achaean, Aeolian. Athens was Ionian. Sparta, like Melos, was Dorian. Melos was trying to steer a neutral course though, and not directly allied with Sparta. When Athens arrived on the island, they sent a delegation to the residents to issue an ultimatum. That conversation is what is captured in the Dialogue.

The Dialogue is often associated with the classical realism school of international relations, and while the fineries of academic theories of foreign affairs are also not relevant to this discussion, the conflict in Ukraine is my purpose in writing this. As we go through this, Putin and Russia are cast in the role of Athens, and Ukraine plays the role of Melos, Putin’s Ionians to their Ukrainian cousins’ Dorians.

Athens begins with a blunt, and famous, summation of their view of the balance of power.

For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences…since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.

However you characterize it, “might makes right” or “survival of the fittest”, the “strong do what they can” is a fitting description of the arc of human history. It is behind Putin’s motivation to send his military into Ukraine. He clearly viewed Ukraine as weak enough that he could do what he wanted.

Athens then tried to convince the Melians it was in their interest to submit to Athens, and it was in Athens’ own interest not to destroy Melos, though what great benefit Melos could’ve provided for Athens is not clear.

Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule?

Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.

Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side.

Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power.

The Melians go on to point out if they surrender immediately, they are definitely lost, but as long as they hold out, there is hope that they could survive. One source of hope is that the Spartans might come to their aid. The Melians point out that in such an event Athens could be at risk.

Athens claims hope is a luxury the weak cannot afford.

Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men with hopes to their destruction.

It is the way of the bully. The appearance of unmatchable strength, the claim that no one can save you now. Putin hoped to cow Ukraine into not resisting, and in that he was wrong.

So, is there a lesson for us today? In this episode itself, it did not end well for the Melians. They resisted, help from Sparta was not forthcoming, and Athens destroyed Melos. The Athenians killed the men and enslaved the women and children. This is not how we want the Ukrainian story to end.

There are differences though between the Melians and Ukrainians. For starters, Ukraine is receiving more help from its allies then the Melians ever did. Perhaps Putin was justified in thinking might is right, and that the fractured, decadent West would not be eager to stand against a nuclear-armed Russia.

Ukraine is receiving help though, and while I’m not smart enough to judge its role in Ukraine’s survival to this point, perhaps it has been a deciding factor in a way that history did not let play out with the Melians. “Might makes right” might be a cold yet correct calculation. It’s just that in this case, Putin gravely misjudged the might of Ukraine, and that was the error.

The following year, Athens began its disastrous expedition to Sicily, the complete failure of which led to Athens’ surrender in 404 BC and ensured that Athens would never again achieve the power and prominence it once had. (Sparta’s victory was a Pyrrhic one and they too were weakened. Defeated at Leuctra in 371 BC, Sparta was no longer a great power and the way was paved for the rise of Alexander and the Macedonians forty years later.)

It is unclear at this point if Ukraine is in fact serving as Sicily for Putin’s Russia. The Dialogue is still ongoing, and not yet at its conclusion. Ukraine’s fate is not yet that of Melos. Perhaps Russia has bitten off more than it can chew in Ukraine, and that will lead to long-lasting changes that greatly weaken Putin and Russia. Would a weakened Russia have follow-on effects that we can’t imagine yet?

Thucydides never completed his History. It is likely he died while completing Book 8, which literally ends mid-sentence. From our vantage point, we can look back and see how the story ended, how the sentence ended. We have no such luxury when still in the middle of the story. Like Melos, we can only trust in our faith, our allies, our conviction that we’re in the right and hope we have the strength to resist the myriad of foes that beset us.

The Melians’ final reply to Athens was one of defiance, and it is the reply of Ukraine today. Is it ours?

Our resolution, Athenians, is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of freedom a city that has been inhabited these seven hundred years; but we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both.