Yglesias: All You Need Is Clairvoyance

Matt Yglesias has been, with a few exceptions, a generally-intelligent leftyblogger. However, he provides further proof of Berg's Axiom: Liberals should be required to pass a test before commenting on defense, the military or foreign policy.

He wrote last week about an article in the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Marc Sargeman.

Says Sargeman in his article (italicized for comparison with Yglesias)

Indeed, there are not that many terrorists in America. There have never been any sleeper cells. All the terrorists are fairly obvious. The FBI cases we see in the press tend to unravel. The Detroit group has been exonerated, and the prosecutor is now being prosecuted for malfeasance on the planted evidence. He allegedly knew exculpatory facts that he did not present to the defense. The only sleeper America has ever had in a century was Soviet Col. Rudolf Abel, who was arrested in the late 1950s and exchanged for Gary Powers, the U2 pilot. Eastern European countries did send sleepers to this country, men fully trained who “go to sleep”—lead normal lives—and then are activated to become fully operational. But they all became Americans.

Sargeman is correct, as far as we know - and as re: Eastern European sleepers, we know a lot since the fall of the wall.

But - and this is a serious question - couldn't the difference in motivations matter? Eastern European sleepers were sent here after being taught that ineluctable forces of history were rendering the West obsolete; they could see with their own eyes that it wasn't true. Now a Moslem would be sent here after being indoctrinated in a much deeper-rooted ideology; one raised from birth in an ideology that believed in both the corruption of the West and the religious need to convert or kill them would find a lifetime of proof. Religion is a much more powerful motivator than Marxism's materialistic tropes.

It's a theory.

Sargeman continues:

In order to really sustain your motivation to do terrorism, you need the reinforcement of group dynamics. You need reinforcement from your family, your friends. This social movement was dependent on volunteers, and there are huge gaps worldwide on those volunteers. One of the gaps is the United States. This is one of two reasons we have not had a major terrorist operation in the United States since 9/11. The other is that we are far more vigilant. We have actually made coming to the U.S. far more difficult for potential terrorists since 2001.

And I'll allow that there might be something to this. But the problem with sleepers is that while you might know that you've found some of them, you don't know that you've found them all until either some external event allows you a look at the other side's files (as with the USSR, but as will likely never happen with the Islamofascists), or one of them comes out of hiding and does something nasty (or, possibly, defects).

Food for thought, to be sure. Now, on to Yglesias' conclusions, in which he refers to the Moslems' perceptions of "near" enemies (in the Middle East) and "Far" enemies (in the West):

It's worth keeping in mind as you read this that Sageman's study is limited to "the ones who actually targeted the 'far enemy,' the U.S., as opposed to their own governments." One of the problems, I think, with the "war on terrorism" frame is that it leads to undue emphasis on these people -- the small number fighting the "far enemy," i.e., terrorists -- to the exclusion of the larger number of people attracted to the Salafi movement who either lack the inclination or the capacity to hit the far enemy. On one level, it's natural for us to be primarily concerned with people trying to attack us. On another level, despite the horror of the Madrid train bombing or even 9/11 itself, the United States and Spain are both perfectly fine notwithstanding the loss of life and destruction of the infrastructure.

In 1939, the Germans had no capacity for long range strategic bombing; they never really developed one during the war. At the end of the war, they had both atomic bomb and long-range strategic missile programs; it was a matter of time and effort before they developed the ability to nuke New York (although exactly how much time and effort is a matter of historical theory and hypothesis, thankfully).

Are most terrorists focused on the "near" enemy? Probably, if only through proximity; if my ideology bade me to attack a non-Minnesotan, I'd probably start with Wisconsin before I dealt with Maryland, too.

The problem with this notion is that it doesnt' matter if only 1% of terrorists focus on us; if that 1% gets control of airliners or nuclear weapons or a car full of nail bombs at the Mall of America during Pokemon Festival, it doesn't matter that so few of them tried, only that one of them got through. Which is why we fight a "war on terrorism".

More importantly, had we let Islamofascists topple more governments and get more governments and safe areas under their control - as they vanquished or co-opted the "near enemy" - they would have had the funding and breathing room to focus more on the "far enemy". It's a basic tenet of military history; when in a war of any type, it's better to seize and hold the initiative, because if you don't, a smart enemy surely will.

And with that initiative, they would pick the time and place where the war will be fought.

Again - if we don't take the lead in the war on terror, they will.

Posted by Mitch at December 28, 2004 09:59 AM | TrackBack