Scott Ritter's new piece in the Christian Science Monitor, "Iraq sarin shell is not part of a secret cache", probably answers a lot of questions - if you don't think about it too much.
Ritter, who was in intelligence officer with a Marine artillery battalion during his time in the Corps, says:
I would often find myself deployed in the field, on exercises where thousands of live artillery rounds were fired downrange.Let's stop right here.
In keeping with the Marine artillery motto of "shoot, move, communicate," we were always moving from one firing location to another to simulate modern war.
Note the scenario carefully: Ritter was an intelligence officer for an artillery unit - probably a First Lieutenant. His job was trying to figure out where enemy targets were.
He goes on to describe some things that he learned in that job. Note them carefully - we'll come back to them:
This mobility had us often passing through live-fire impact areas. One thing you quickly learned was not to touch anything lying on the ground, because modern artillery shells had a high "dud" rate, meaning they didn't always function the way they were intended. Tens of thousands of these "duds" were scattered across the desert terrain, not unlike those found in Iraq.Seems sensible enough to me - after any major war, the danger of unexploded ordnance is always a huge problem; they're still uncovering live bombs from World War II in London and Berlin.
But remember - he's talking about live fire training for a combat unit.
Not ordnance and munitions testing. The difference, as I hope you'll see below, is crucial.
In the next section Ritter - the last two years of whose life has been an exercise in steering his arguments into the logical weeds - steers into the logical, er, weeds.
The key to whether the sarin artillery round came from an arms cache or was a derelict dud rests in the physical characteristics of the shell. The artillery shells in question were fitted with two aluminum cannisters separated by a rupture disk. The two precursor chemicals for the kind of sarin associated with this shell were stored separately in these containers. The thrust of the shell being fired was designed to cause the liquid in the forward cannister to press back and break the rupture disk, whereupon the rotation of the shell as it headed downrange would mix the two precursors together, creating sarin. Upon impact with the ground - or in the air, if a timed fuse was used - a burster charge would break the shell, releasing the sarin gas.Emphasis added.Many things go wrong when firing an artillery round: the propellent charge can be faulty, resulting in a round that doesn't reach its target; the fuse can malfunction, preventing the burster charge from going off, leaving the round intact; the rupture disk can fail to burst, keeping precursor chemicals from combining. The fuse could break off on impact, leaving the fuse cavity empty. To the untrained eye, the artillery shell, if found in this state, would look weathered, but unfired.
What gives away whether the shell had been fired is the base-bleed charge, which unlike the rest of the shell, will show evidence of being fired (or not). Iraq declared that it had produced 170 of these base-bleed sarin artillery shells as part of a research and development program that never led to production. Ten of these shells were tested using inert fill - oil and colored water. Ten others were tested in simulated firing using the sarin precursors. And 150 of these shells, filled with sarin precursors, were live-fired at an artillery range south of Baghdad. A 10 percent dud rate among artillery shells isn't unheard of - and even greater percentages can occur. So there's a good possibility that at least 15 of these sarin artillery shells failed and lie forgotten in the Iraq desert, waiting to be picked up by any unsuspecting insurgent looking for raw material from which to construct an IED.
Given what's known about sarin shells, the US could be expected to offer a careful recital of the data with news of the shell. But facts that should have accompanied the story - the type of shell, its condition, whether it had been fired previously, and the age and viability of the sarin and precursor chemicals - were absent.
So the media - most of whose members can't tell the difference between an F-16 and an M-16 - didn't report the condition of the base bleed plugs on a shell - when most of them doing know the difference between a breechblock and an ogive, or a barrel and a barrel liner. A component of a shell - a specialized component of a very specialized shell, at that. This on a shell that, by the way, exploded, at least partially.
On this basis, Ritter declares the notion of a stockpile dead.
Ritter also notes that the 150 rounds fired were test rounds containing live precursors. Unanswered by Ritter:
I think you're way off base. I mean, what engineer in his right mind would want to do failure analysis on dud chemical warfare shells?
Errr, never mind.
Posted by: Steve Gigl at May 21, 2004 02:07 PMwhat engineer in his right mind would want to do failure analysis on dud chemical warfare shells?
Posted by: gagarin at May 22, 2004 10:30 AMan iraqi one if told to do so. better chances to survive.
Interesting post on an article that just looks curiouser and curiouser the more it gets examined.
In Blaster's comments ( http://www.overpressure.com/archives/week_2004_05_16.html#000827 ), I describe some efforts to locate Ritter's source for his citation of 170 155mm shells. www.iraqwatch.org has what appears to be a complete set of released UNSCOM and UNMOVIC documents, and a search function. After going through a few 150-plus pdf files page-by-page, I came up with nothing that could have been his source.
Of course, a version of UNSCOM's accounting that matches Ritter's claims may exist, somewhere. And the lack of a citation isn't self explanatory; it could be due to laziness or incompetence instead of deceptive intent.
But when anybody writes this way, it sends up a big warning flag--and Ritter isn't _anybody_, he's somebody who has earned his reputation as a Ba'athist apologist many times over.
Some CSM articles on Iraq have seemed pretty balanced; other times they seem happy to join in the HateBush media campaign.
Either way, Ritter's article is an embarassment. Doesn't the CSM believe in fact checking?
Posted by: AMac at May 22, 2004 03:30 PMMitch, I emailed Claire Germani, op-ed editor of the CSM, asking about their policy of fact-checking op-ed pieces. I referred her to this post and to posts at www.overpressure.com for details on the issues. I can't find your contact info; write me if you would like a copy.
Posted by: AMac at May 22, 2004 03:54 PMAs a weapons inspector, Scott Ritter was immersed in the arsenals of Iraq, and had the council of experts to form his conclusions. When he comments on these issues today, I am sure he still has quality sources to back his claims.
Thus far his assertions on Iraq's capabilities have been quite accurate, so dismissing him as a Ba'athist apologist doesn't fly.
Posted by: Scott at May 25, 2004 05:18 AMHe was on the payroll of a hussein apologist, and his opinions on a number of matters have been thoroughly refuted - including this one (see my link to Donald Sensing, above.
Saying somebody is an expert just isn't enough.
Posted by: mitch at May 25, 2004 06:12 AM