Intelligence Revisited - Austin Bay

Intelligence Revisited - Austin Bay with a fascinating piece - the second of three parts - on the history of intelligence in Iraq. It covers successes and failures, and the majority in between.:

One of many fascinating excerpts:

"A major mistake occurred in 1996. Clinton directed CIA to back anti-Saddam dissidents. In August 1996, however, Saddam's forces struck northern Iraq and killed Iraqi dissidents. The United States failed to stop the assault, and the policy of 'protecting Kurds' was damaged. Some dissidents called it a 'little Budapest,' alluding to the U.S. failure to support the Hungarian revolt against the USSR in 1956. Many nations concluded the United States wasn't serious about toppling Saddam. The 1991 coalition, already frayed, unraveled some more.

Yet Clinton's 1998 Desert Fox air campaign, unleashed after U.N. inspectors withdrew, now appears to have severely damaged Saddam's weapons programs. But in 1998, the degree of damage was tough to ascertain. Without U.N. inspectors, Iraqi defector allegations and electronic intelligence became 'best' sources. Both indicated Saddam pursued illegal programs. Defectors, however, have their own agendas."

(Via Instapundit)