Inspections

Katherine Kersten says this round is unlikely to succeed.

During its seven-year tenure in Iraq, UNSCOM was fairly successful at detecting Saddam's chemical and biological weapons. In part, this was because it operated outside the United Nations' grossly inefficient bureaucracy. UNSCOM arms inspectors were highly qualified experts, on loan from national governments. To evaluate Saddam's Scuds, for example, UNSCOM bypassed scientists with a general knowledge of rocketry, and recruited experts who knew Scuds firsthand.

UNMOVIC will be part of the labyrinthine U.N. bureaucracy, and will have a "college of commissioners" -- made up of career diplomats, not arms experts -- who must approve its decisions. Unlike UNSCOM, UNMOVIC will draw its inspectors only from the ranks of U.N. employees. As a result, many highly qualified arms experts will be ineligible to serve.

UNMOVIC will also differ from UNSCOM in stressing "geographic balance" over inspectors' technical expertise. Some inspectors are likely to have little experience with the weapons systems they are evaluating, since their own countries do not possess them. Worse yet, UNMOVIC will not require its inspectors to complete a security clearance process. Iraqi infiltration -- a problem in the past -- is highly likely.