Iran

Michael Ledeen of the National Review continues to report on what seems, to some observers, to be portents of the downfall of the "mullahcracy", after half a million Iranians hit the streets over the weekend:

Rafsanjani and his allies are preparing still greater repression for the suffering people of Iran, due o be launched on Wednesday, and already on Sunday members of the failed reformist movement were telling the students to calm down, so as not to provide a pretext for the looming crackdown. But it is by no means clear that the regime has the blind loyalty of the security forces any longer; during the recent demonstrations there were several instances of defections to the demonstrators' side, and even the Revolutionary Guards have been subjected to repeated purges, as the mullahs seek desperately to find willing killers and torturers.

Which brings us back to the debate-that-is-not-happening. How can we tell when a regime is about to fall? The key ingredient is not the sort of thing that the political scientists talk about in the academies, because it can't be measured, only smelled: It is a combination of failure of nerve at the top, and resolute desperation from below. On both counts, the trends are encouraging, but brutal repression is invariably successful if it is delivered with overwhelming strength, and the would-be revolutionaries cannot effectively cope with it.

We do not know how this will play out in the coming days and weeks, but one thing is already luminously clear: The Bush administration has missed an opportunity to strike a massive blow against the terror masters. If, instead of winking and nodding at various Iranian emissaries and back channels, we had supported the Iranian people with money, effective radio and television, and modern communications gear, the regime could very well have been smashed this past weekend.

That is a good question - why are we not exploiting this (or at least exploiting this more visibly)? Perhaps to avoid rekindling memories of the US tinkering that brought the Shah to power? Perhaps because Iraq seems the riper target, or at least the easier one to topple?

Maybe because the whole purpose is to stir the region up enough to cause the overthrow of the mullahcracies more or less spontaneously (with lots of help from us)?

I'm certainly entertaining suggestions.

Posted by Mitch at November 25, 2002 01:00 PM