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A German Food Line – the initial effects of the blockade weren’t really felt until 1915 as the 1914 crops had already been harvested when the war began<\/p><\/div>\n
While the Central Powers were experimenting with new technologies to try and win the war, unleashing poison gas<\/a> and zeppelin raids<\/a>, the Entente’s most powerful weapon had been among the simplest – starvation. \u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n With the largest navy in the world, and with their French ally sporting a massive armada themselves, Britain’s blockade of Germany was easily accomplished in the war’s opening months. \u00a0Britain’s classification of the North Sea as a “war zone” discouraged neutral powers from even attempting to sail, let alone ship any goods that could be considered “contraband” to Kaiser Wilhelm II. \u00a0Under most circumstances, contraband would be defined as anything that could be war-related material; for Britain, contraband now included food.<\/p>\n Such a sweeping definition flew in the face of previously established international law. \u00a0The\u00a0second Hague International Peace Convention in 1907 and the\u00a0International Naval Conference of London in 1909 had protected the rights of neutral vessels so long as they carried strictly civilian supplies. \u00a0And as fluid as the term “war munitions” could be (small arms ammunition, like the four million rounds in the Lusitania<\/em><\/a>, were not legally viewed as munitions), the definition of “civilian supplies” seemed more straight-forward. \u00a0How was a loaf of bread a weapon of war?<\/p>\n —<\/p>\n American attitudes towards the blockade were surprisingly pro-German to start, since the move hurt the American economy by closing off many European markets. \u00a0The German reaction to the blockade (specifically, their submarine attacks) quickly shifted American opinion towards the British position<\/p><\/div>\n In the Great War’s opening months, the largest threat to Germany’s blockade appeared to be American politicians, not the sizeable German fleet.<\/p>\n London’s domination of international trade had given them substantial leverage when it came to most neutral powers. \u00a0Those neutral nations that refused to cancel their contracts with German industries had more to worry about than the British sinking a ship. \u00a0Loans financed through British institutions could be canceled, or merchant ships needing coal could be stranded at one of the numerous coaling stations around the world controlled by the British. \u00a0Such threats were rarely required as Britain found a far better tactic to ensure neutral compliance with the blockade – they’d simply buy out the supplies. \u00a0The British purchase of almost the entire Norwegian fish market, in one example, not only kept Germany hunger, but starved Norway as well.<\/p>\n Such tactics could work wonders on small, diplomatically isolated nations. \u00a0They would have less success on the United States. \u00a0The U.S. could finance their own deals through New York, or worse, finance the loans of neutrals whose loans had been cancelled in London. \u00a0So threats were out of the equation – but bribery wasn’t. \u00a0Britain argued to buy increased American goods and American munitions, at ridiculous prices. \u00a0J.P. Morgan Jr. alone earned $30 million ($700 million in today’s dollars), selling munitions to the Entente. \u00a0Such commerce kept American politicians, frustrated by the blockade’s economic effects, somewhat mollified.<\/p>\n “Farmers, do your duty – the cities are hungry.” German pro-war propaganda<\/p><\/div>\n The American public was a different matter. \u00a0The news of German food riots as early as December of 1914<\/a>\u00a0brought out American sympathies that the British were targeting German civilians instead of German soldiers. \u00a0But such sympathies were quickly crushed between Germany’s zeppelin terror tactics, unrestricted submarine warfare<\/a>, and the actions of pro-German fanatics<\/a>.<\/p>\n Between the blockade and anti-German headlines, American trade with the Central Powers declined by 90%. And by the fall of 1915, American complaints about the blockade had largely vanished. \u00a0German hopes of international pressure easing the restrictions were gone.<\/p>\n —<\/p>\n Before the war, 77% of Germany’s imported tonnage had been raw materials and chemicals necessary for the nation’s massive industries. \u00a0Only 17.5% of Germany’s imports had been food<\/a>. \u00a0So why was the nation already starving?<\/p>\n Making Kriegsbrot (“war bread”). As the war progressed, rye flour was replaced with sawdust and wheat flour with dried turnip leaves<\/p><\/div>\n Most of the chemicals that were necessary for German agriculture had been imported. \u00a0(the father of chemical warfare, Fritz Haber, had first used his invention to create fertilizer<\/a>). \u00a0Coupled with the manpower shortage from conscripting millions of able-bodied men, German farms lacked the ability to plant, grow and reap crops as they had before the war. \u00a0Even with 900,000 POWs being forced to tend to German crops, the labor needs could not be met. \u00a0German industry was also placing higher and higher demands on German farms. \u00a0A quarter-million cows were needed to build the leak-proof hydrogen chambers of just one zeppelin<\/a>. \u00a0There simply weren’t enough goods to go around.<\/p>\n By 1915 the food situation reached critical levels in urban areas. \u00a0The 1914 harvest had already been brought in by the time the war had begun, delaying any immediate effects from the blockade. \u00a0But now, food was becoming expensive and scarce. \u00a0Rumors began spreading that farmers were stockpiling food for themselves. \u00a0The people left on the home front were now largely relying on a diet of potatoes and bread, but now even these were becoming difficult to purchase and heavily diluted. \u00a0Factories began turning out\u00a0Kriegsbrot<\/em> (“war bread”), a recipe of replacing rye flour with sawdust.<\/p>\n By the start of 1916, soap, fat, cheese, butter and eggs were practically unavailable, while coal, shoes and textiles were scarce at best. \u00a0With food prices getting higher and higher, the government implemented maximum prices on certain products, including sugar and potatoes. \u00a0To combat the decrease in availability of food, the German government also established compulsory ‘meatless’ and ‘fatless’ days. \u00a0The average German citizen was down to 1,700 calories a day – not a significant drop from the recommended 2,000 calories a day – but a figure that represented that despite the nation’s best efforts, Germany was slowing starving to death.<\/p>\n —<\/p>\n Food Where You Can Find It – Berliners carve up a dead horse. By 1917, the average urban German was consuming only 1,000 calories a day<\/p><\/div>\n The situation in Germany going into 1917 was one of growing chaos, disorganization, and sickness all stemming from the blockade. \u00a0While few individuals starved to death between 1914-1918 – \u00a0post-war statistics estimated that 763,000 starved to death because of the blockade\u00a0– millions did succumb to malnutrition which led to severe decreases in body mass, and nearly constant suffering from various medical aliments. \u00a0Between 1913 and 1918 the death rate from tuberculosis in towns with more than 15,000 inhabitants rose 91.1%. \u00a0The numbers dying of typhoid doubled between 1916 and 1917. \u00a0In D\u00fcsseldorf the number of reported cases of dysentry rose from 8 in 1914 to 351 in 1917. \u00a0By December of 1918 over half the children in schools suffered from anaemia, and children across Germany were smaller and lighter.<\/p>\n By the summer of 1917, rations were down to 1,000 calories per day and German civilians were being forced to turn to the black market to even get that many calories. \u00a0By the end of the war, 1\/3rd of Germany’s food supplies were sold “underground.”<\/p>\n Aftermath of a Food Riot – the targets of these riots had little to do with setting prices and were struggling to feed themselves as well<\/p><\/div>\n Dwindling rations also began to affect the German Army – and not just in terms of food. \u00a0Clothing and other equipment also began to diminish in both quantity and quality during the last two years of the war. \u00a0By 1917, German soldiers were issued uniforms that were inadequate to keep there bodies warm, or protect them from the elements. \u00a0Hundreds of thousands received boots without soles, no socks, jackets without buttons, and shirts made from donated women’s undergarments. \u00a0German units were fed considerably better than civilians, averaging 2,900 calories per day. \u00a0But that number had dropped since the start of the war and paled by comparison to their Entente counterparts. \u00a0British troops averaged 4,000 calories per day amid the grueling physical demands of the trenches.<\/p>\n —<\/p>\n The blockade of Germany was certainly a terrible hardship on German civilians and Germany’s war industry, but how much of a role did it play in winning the war?<\/p>\n German U-Boat Propaganda – the blockade forced Germany back to their unrestricted submarine warfare tactics, despite concerns doing so would lead to an American entry on the side of the Entente<\/p><\/div>\n The immediate interpretation after the armistice was that the blockade had triggered such deprivations that it helped create the conditions for the Kiel mutiny of the German Navy, which is partially credited for ending the war. \u00a0That the morale of the German Navy was horrendously low, and that amid negotiations to end the conflict the Navy’s officers were demanding one last major battle with the British, were likely far larger factors in a mutiny that likely had less of an effect on forcing the Great War to a conclusion.<\/p>\n But one can say the blockade won the war for the Entente by forcing Germany’s hand in the reinstatement of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 – which led to the entry of the United States into the conflict.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n An estimated 763,000 Germans died of starvation or relented illnesses during the Great War. The exact numbers are highly debated<\/p><\/div>\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/histclo.com\/imagef\/date\/2007\/11\/Fcart1s.jpg\")
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