{"id":45210,"date":"2014-06-26T05:00:51","date_gmt":"2014-06-26T10:00:51","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.shotinthedark.info\/wp\/?p=45210"},"modified":"2014-06-26T11:19:37","modified_gmt":"2014-06-26T16:19:37","slug":"45210","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.shotinthedark.info\/wp\/?p=45210","title":{"rendered":"Straw"},"content":{"rendered":"

Joe Doakes from Como Park emails:<\/p>\n

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Naturally, I favor the dissent\u00a0in the Abramski straw-buyer gun case<\/a>.\u00a0 This section caught my eye:<\/p>\n

That Abramski\u2019s reading does not render the Act\u2019s requirements \u201cmeaningless\u201d is further evidenced by the fact that, for decades, even ATF itself did not read the statute to criminalize conduct like Abramski\u2019s. After Congress passed the Act in 1968, ATF\u2019s initial position was that the Act did not prohibit the sale of a gun to an eligible buyer acting on behalf of a third party (even an ineligible one). See Hearings Before the Subcommittee To Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 118 (1975).A few years later, ATF modified its position and asserted that the Act did not \u201cprohibit a dealer from making a sale to a person who is actually purchasing the firearm for another person\u201d unless the other person was \u201cprohibited from receiving or possessing a firearm,\u201d in which case the dealer could be guilty of \u201cunlawfully aiding the prohibited person\u2019s own violation.\u201d ATF, Industry Circular 79\u201310(1979), in (Your Guide To) Federal Firearms Regulation1988\u201389 (1988), p. 78. The agency appears not to have adopted its current position until the early 1990\u2019s. See United States v. Polk, 118 F. 3d 286, 295, n. 7 (CA5 1997).<\/p>\n

The majority deems this enforcement history \u201cnot relevant\u201d because the Government\u2019s reading of a criminal statute is not entitled to deference. Ante, at 22. But the fact that the agency charged with enforcing the Act read it, over a period of roughly 25 years, not to apply to the type of conduct at issue here is powerful evidence that interpreting the Act in that way is natural and reasonable and does not make its requirements \u201cmeaningless.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cEven if the statute were wrongly thought to be ambigu\u00adous on this point, the rule of lenity would defeat the Gov\u00adernment\u2019s construction. It is a \u201cfamiliar principle\u201d that \u201c\u2018ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.\u2019\u201d\u00a0Skilling\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0United States<\/em>, 561 U. S. 358, 410 (2010). That principle prevents us from giving the words of a criminal statute \u201ca meaning that is different from [their] ordinary, accepted meaning, and that disfavors the defendant.\u201d\u00a0Burrage\u00a0<\/em>v.United States<\/em>, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 12). And it means that when a criminal statute has two possible readings, we do not \u201c\u2018choose the harsher alternative\u2019\u201d unless Congress has \u201c\u2018spoken in language that is clear and definite.\u2019\u201d\u00a0United States\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0Bass<\/em>, 404 U. S. 336, 347\u2013349 (1971). For the reasons given above, it cannot be said that the statute unambiguously commands the Government\u2019s current reading. It is especially contrary to sound practice to give this criminal statute a meaning that the Govern\u00adment itself rejected for years.\u201d<\/p>\n

I wasn\u2019t aware the government had reversed its interpretation of the statute and I never heard of a rule of lenity.\u00a0 But the dissent makes sense to me.<\/p>\n

Joe Doakes<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Further proof that:<\/p>\n